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Henry Hart wrote that the criminal law serves as “the foundation 
of a free society’s effort to build up each individual’s sense of response-
bility as a guide and stimulus to the constructive development of his 
capacity for effectual and fruitful decision.”1 Police officers are the most 
emblematic and visible representatives of the criminal law that the ave-
rage, law-abiding citizen encounters. If Hart’s assertion is correct, then 
the police force must serve a prominent role in the quality of that found-
ation for individuals in a community. And if the legitimacy of that force 
is compromised by unequal enforcement of law, unwarranted criminal 
suspicion, and erosion of constitutional rights, the community suffers 
both from the inequity of law and an attack on the moral underpinnings 
of the community. 
Recent Black Lives Matter and similar protests in Baltimore, Mary-
land; Ferguson, Missouri; New York City, New York and many other 
municipalities demonstrate that many police departments are lacking 
 
†  Research associate in the Cato Institute’s Project on Criminal Justice and 
managing editor of PoliceMisconduct.net. 
1. Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, in In the Name of 
Justice: Leading Experts Reexamine the Classic Article “The Aims 
of the Criminal Law” 1, 10 (Timothy Lynch ed., Cato Institute 2009). 
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legitimacy in the eyes of many people they are sworn to protect and 
serve. This is particularly true for African Americans. Some of the un-
derlying conflict is no doubt historical, as police and communities of 
color have been in tension as long as they have coexisted. To this day, 
African Americans continue to have lower trust in law enforcement2 
and report more negative traffic stop experiences with police (relative 
to population) than white Americans.3 It would be simpler to attribute 
these phenomena to individual racism—whether they are due to overt 
discrimination or implicit race bias—than to deal with them as systemic 
problems because, in theory anyway, getting rid of a few officers is 
easier than revamping the way a police organization operates. 
Whren v. United States4 clarified the Supreme Court’s support of 
the practice of pretextual stops—using minor traffic violations as a rea-
son to stop a person in order to investigate suspicious activity. However, 
a tactic’s legality does not make it inherently ethical, just, or effective. 
The following essay considers the role of pretextual stops in relation to 
police departments’ relationship with minority communities, particular-
ly black communities. I argue that pretextual stops are one part of a 
larger and deeply troubling mélange of legal fictions, intentional decep-
tion of the innocent, and perverse incentives that undermine the percep-
tions of legitimacy of law enforcement, particularly for black Americans. 
As a partial remedy to the larger problem of police legitimacy in black 
communities, I contend the use of pretextual stops ought to be severely 
curtailed or eliminated outright in order to improve police relationships 
with African Americans. 
I. The Role of Police Legitimacy 
Compliance with the law is a voluntary exercise in a free society, 
and governments have limited capability to increase that compliance. 
 
2. Jeffery M. Jones, Urban Blacks in U.S. Have Little Confidence in Police, 
Gallup (Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/179909/urban-blacks-
little-confidence-police.aspx [https://perma.cc/PRJ8-RE3H]. 
3. On author observed: 
[P]olice stops also divide Americans into two groups. On the one side 
are people for whom police stops are the signal form of surveillance and 
legal racial subordination. This group is populated largely by African 
Americans and other racial minorities. On the other side are people 
for whom police stops are annoyances that, at worst, yield expensive 
traffic tickets, but which also reaffirm the driver’s place as a full citizen 
in a rule-regulated society. This group is populated largely by whites.  
 Charles R. Epp, Steven Maynard-Moody & Donald P. Haider-
Markel, Pulled Over: How Police Stops Define Race and Citizen-
ship 150 (John M. Conley & Lynn Mather eds., 2014). 
4. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
Thin Blue Lies 
933 
That said, in a functional and lawful society, most people follow most 
of the laws most of the time. The two dominant methods the govern-
ment can use to encourage compliance with the law are deterrence 
through fear and cooperation through legitimacy. Very basically sum-
marized, the former assumes individuals fear punishment for violating 
the law; the latter relies on an individual’s acceptance of the legitimacy 
of the government or its agents that create and enforce those laws.5 
Deterrence plays a role in policing, but that role may currently be 
too large relative to its effectiveness6 in many cities. For the purposes 
of this essay, assume that aggressive enforcement of the law through 
traffic and pedestrian stops is, in part, a stratagem for deterring crime 
and the carrying of contraband and that there is a positive effect on 
crime reduction. But heavy enforcement in areas that have been and 
continue to suffer high crime strongly suggests that such deterrence-
through-enforcement has its limits.7 This deterrence may also have un-
intended costs by sowing or reifying mistrust—thereby undercutting 
the legitimacy—of the police in black communities. Taking the findings 
further then, if the presence of legitimacy increases compliance with 
the law, the absence or diminishment of legitimacy may decrease com-
pliance with the law. Aggressive policing that undermines police legiti-
macy may have negative effects on public safety and crime rates. Thus, 
improving police legitimacy may be just as important to the communit-
ies as it is to the relationship between those communities and the police. 
II. The Social Impacts of Pretextual Stops 
Research by Professor Charles Epp and others from the University 
of Kansas suggests that traffic stops have no effect on drivers’ trust in 
police from drivers who get caught speeding when they believe they 
were treated fairly, regardless of race.8 Epp’s research suggests that de-
spite generally higher levels of distrust that blacks feel toward police, 
being stopped for unambiguously running afoul of the law has no effect  
5. See Tracey Meares, The Legitimacy of Police Among Young African- 
American Men, 92 Marq. L. Rev. 651, 656–59 (2009) (discussing deterrence 
theory versus legitimacy theory). 
6. See Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 59 (1990) (noting that 
the results of one empirical experiment that showed the influence of legitimacy 
was about five times greater on compliance than deterrence). 
7. See Jeffery Fagan & Tom R. Tyler, Policing, Order Maintenance and 
Legitimacy, in Policing in Central and Eastern Europe: Dilemmas 
of Contemporary Criminal Justice 39, 39 (Gorazd Mesko, Milan Pagon, 
& Bojan Dobovsek eds., 2004), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/Mesko/ 
207975.pdf (“While there is evidence that deterrence works, the same body 
of research evidence points to difficulties with deterrence strategies that lead 
them to be far from optimal approaches to social order maintenance.”). 
8. Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 143. 
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on trust (and, consequently, legitimacy) of law enforcement. Although 
black drivers were more likely to receive tickets than white drivers, that 
difference was not found to be statistically significant.9 And while blacks 
were more likely than whites to be placed in handcuffs or be arrested 
as a result of a traffic safety stop at a statistically significant differ-
ence,10 the traffic safety stops did not produce racially disparate impact 
in the trust of police.11 Moreover, researchers found that whites were 
more likely to be stopped for excessive speeding and other traffic safety 
reasons, but blacks were far more likely to be stopped for investigatory 
stops or given no reason at all for being pulled over.12 
The Kansas researchers also found that pretextual investigatory 
stops—such as those condoned by Whren—contributed heavily to pol-
ice mistrust and ill-will by African Americans.13 Their data, taken from 
a sample of traffic stops in Kansas City and published in their book 
Pulled Over, showed that white and black drivers generally felt the 
traffic safety stops were legitimate because they knew they were pulled 
over for speeding and were most often treated in a way they viewed 
was fair.14 However, when the stop was for a minor infraction and led 
to the officer asking prying questions and requesting to search the 
vehicle, the stops engendered hostility and resentment among all races, 
but particularly among African Americans and Latinos—who were 
stopped much more often for investigatory purposes—whether or not 
the officer was polite and respectful.15 
In those encounters, the drivers were kept for up to an hour—some-
times in handcuffs or standing in front of their car as the police searched 
and as traffic drove by.16 Given that the people most often subjected to 
these denigrating investigative searches—both in pedestrian stops17 and 
 
9. Id. at 81 fig.4.1. 
10. Id. at 83. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. at 61 fig.3.1. 
13. Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 143. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 6 (“What makes inquisitive police stops so offensive to so many African 
Americans and Latinos is not that the officers carrying them out are impolite 
or even frankly bigoted, but that these stops are common, repeated, routine, 
and event scripted.”).  
16. Id. at 24. 
17. See, e.g., Stop and Frisk Data, N.Y. Civ. Liberties Union, http://www. 
nyclu.org/content/stop-and-frisk-data (last visited May 9, 2016) [https:// 
perma.cc/3C3Y-PQPM] (showing that African Americans and Latinos are 
stopped far more often—both in percentage of population and real numbers—
than whites for pedestrian investigatory stops and frisks). 
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traffic stops18—are black, if African Americans trust police less, it shou-
ld surprise no one. 
III. Pretextual Stops Rest on Legal Fictions 
A still larger percentage of black drivers Epp surveyed knew some-
one or had their own personal negative experiences dealing with police 
officers relative to white populations, which is consistent with other 
studies.19 Many of those invasive and unpleasant stops are legal under 
existing case law,20 thereby leaving the subjects of those stops with no 
recourse in court. Many black people who are stopped understand or 
believe that the potential cost of saying no to an officer could result in 
officer agitation—resulting in the previously mentioned hour in hand-
cuffs or worse—and a belief the officer may end up searching the car 
anyway.21 Under these circumstances, while consent is “voluntarily 
given” in the eyes of the law, it does not feel that way to those people 
giving it. 
Although this symposium’s focus is on Whren, a case about stop-
ping motorists on pretextual grounds, it is important to remember that 
it is one case in a larger criminal justice and Fourth Amendment milieu 
that creates an illusion of consent and antagonizes innocent people in 
the process. Terry v. Ohio22 is another case that has led to police prac-
tices that render consent illusory.23 The Supreme Court decided Terry 
to provide a rarely used officer-safety exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment, while explicitly warning against the use of police stops as an 
 
18. Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 105–06. 
19. See, e.g., Patricia Y. Warren, Perceptions of Police Disrespect During Vehicle 
Stops: A Race-Based Analysis, 57 Crime & Delinq. 356 (2011) (examining 
the influence of vicarious experiences of police interaction on the public’s 
perception of police conduct). 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (holding that an 
officer’s “factual inferences” drawn under the “totality of the circumstances” 
of a traffic stop may establish reasonable suspicion of illegal activity); see 
Epp, Maynard-Moody, & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 35 (“[T]he 
difference between a legal and illegal stop is not what the officer saw and 
did but how he or she describes it.”). 
21. An officer often will say, falsely, that they will get a warrant and search a car 
anyway to encourage a motorist to submit to a search the officer has no legal 
right to impose without consent. See Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, 
and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 Or. L. Rev. 775, 781 (1997). 
22. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
23. See id. at 30 (holding that police officers may conduct a “carefully limited 
search” of people the officer suspects, based on the given circumstances and 
the officer’s professional experience, may be engaged in criminal activity). 
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interrogation tactic, particularly in minority communities.24 Neverthe-
less, Terry morphed into a virtual carte blanche for stopping and sear-
ching pedestrians in some cities.25 
In a recent concurrence in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, Judge Janice Rogers Brown wrote about this “fiction of volun-
tary consent” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.26 The case, United 
States v. Gross,27 involved patrols of officers called “Gun Recovery 
Units” in predominantly black and high-crime neighborhoods in the 
District of Columbia.28 Officers regularly stop and, with “consent,” sear-
ch people for firearms.29 Comparing the usual locales of these patrols 
with the posh, predominantly white D.C. neighborhood of Georgetown, 
she wrote: 
As a thought experiment, try to imagine this scene in George-
town. Would residents of that neighborhood maintain there was 
no pressure to comply, if the District’s police officers patrolled 
Prospect Street in tactical gear, questioning each person they 
encountered about whether they were carrying an illegal firearm? 
Nothing about the Gun Recovery Unit’s modus operandi is desig-
ned to convey a message that compliance is not required. While 
viewing such an encounter as consensual is roughly equivalent to 
finding the latest Sasquatch sighting credible, I submit to the 
 
24. The Terry Court observed: 
The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice found that “in many communities, field interrogations are 
a major source of friction between the police and minority groups.” It 
was reported that the friction caused by “[m]isuse of field interro-
gations” increases “as more police departments adopt ‘aggressive patrol’ 
in which officers are encouraged routinely to stop and question persons 
on the street who are unknown to them, who are suspicious, or whose 
purpose for being abroad is not readily evident.” While frequency with 
which “frisking” forms a part of field interrogation practice varies tre-
mendously with the locale, the objective of the interrogation and the 
particular officer, it cannot help but be a severely exacerbating factor 
in police-community tensions. This is particularly true where the “stop 
and frisk” of youths or minority group members is “motivated by the 
officers” perceived need to maintain the power image of the beat officer, 
an aim sometimes accomplished by humiliating anyone who attempts 
to undermine police control of the streets.  
 Id. at 14 n.11 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
25. See Stop and Frisk Data, supra note 17 (documenting, based on age and race, 
the number of times police officers stop and frisk people in New York). 
26. United States v. Gross, 784 F.3d 784, 789 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
27. 784 F.3d 784 (D.C. Cir. 2015).  
28.  Id. at 785. 
29. Id. at 785–86. 
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prevailing orthodoxy, but I continue to reject its counterintuitive 
premise.30 
She goes on to say: 
With the guise of voluntary consent stripped away, the reality of 
the District’s regime is revealed. It is a rolling roadblock that 
sweeps citizens up at random and subjects them to undesired po-
lice interactions culminating in a search of their persons and 
effects. If the Fourth Amendment is intended to offer meaningful 
protection in the context of Terry stops, the voluntary consent 
exemption cannot be used to engage with members of the pub-
lic en masse and at random to fabricate articulable suspicions for 
virtually every citizen officers encounter on patrol.31 
Bound by Supreme Court precedent to uphold the stops, Judge 
Brown concurred in judgment but her opinion of the socio-economic 
and—and implicitly racial—double-standard that applies in these situa-
tions could hardly be clearer. 
Such disparities are hardly limited to the District of Columbia. A 
2006 study showed that 18-19 year old black men in New York City 
had nearly an 80 percent chance of being stopped by New York City 
Police in a given year; that figure dips to 50-70 percent when the age 
group expanded to 18-to-24 year olds within the same racial demo-
graphic.32 For whites in these age groups, the percentages were 10 and 
13 percent, respectively.33 This is patently unequal treatment before the 
law. 
IV. Procedural Justice as Legitimacy Tool 
There is a growing body of research34 that suggests that what is 
known as “procedural justice” can mitigate some of the rancor elicited  
30. Id. at 790 (Brown, J., concurring). 
31. Id. at 791 (Brown, J., concurring). 
32. Meares, supra note 5, at 654 (citing Jeffrey Fagan et al., Street Stops and 
Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and Logic of Proactive Policing 
in a Safe and Changing City, in Race, Ethnicity, and Policing 309, 336 
tbls.13.4A & 13.4B (Michael White & Steven Rice eds., 2010)). 
33. Id. 
34. See e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan Jackson & Ben Bradford, Procedural 
Justice and Cooperation, in Encyclopedia of Criminology and Criminal 
Justice 4011, 4011–24 (Gerben Bruinsma & David Weisburd eds., 2014); 
Comprehensive Law Enforcement Review: Procedural Justice and Legitimacy: 
Summary, Cmty. Oriented Policing Servs. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 
http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/taskforce/Procedural-Justice-and-Legitimacy- 
LE-Review-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HM2-AL4X] (last visited Mar. 
18, 2016). 
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by police encounters and enhance police legitimacy, whether in traffic 
or pedestrian stops.35 Broadly, if a police officer treats the subject with 
respect and fairness, the person who is stopped will more likely accept 
the legitimacy of the stop regardless of outcome—even if that outcome 
is ticketing or arrest. But it is very important that procedural justice is 
considered for the whole of the stop, not just whether the police officer 
was friendly or polite after pulling someone over. An overemphasis on 
kindness and courteousness36 may discount the impact of the decision-
making that led to the initial contact or encounter with police in the 
first place. 
Social Psychologists Tom R. Tyler and E. Allan Lind suggest that 
there are three conceptual components police must satisfy with an indi-
vidual to establish legitimacy and thus provide adequate procedural 
justice: trust, standing, and neutrality.37 Trust is the amount of belief 
a person has that an authority figure will act fairly and benevolently in 
the future.38 Standing refers to a person’s belief that the authority figure 
recognizes the inherent value of a person, exemplified by politeness and 
courteousness in interaction.39 Neutrality refers to a person’s perception 
that he is not being discriminated against because of his membership 
in a minority group or other nonindividualized category.40 
One conceptual pitfall when applying procedural justice to a pre-
textual stop is that the stop itself is based on an officer’s hunch that 
very often has a racial component41 that may be perceived by the person 
 
35. See Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 4 (“The 
first assumption [of racial profiling] is that what African Americans find 
offensive—and what ultimately distinguishes a racially problematic stop from 
a racially legitimate stop—is primarily officer rudeness and disrespect, not 
other elements of the stop itself.”); see also Jake Horowitz, Making Every 
Encounter Count: Building Trust and Confidence in the Police, Nat’l 
Inst. for Justice (2007), http://www.nij.gov/journals/256/pages/building- 
trust.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q2ZP-6AD4] (“If [a person in contact with 
police] believes that the officer was fair and professional, then that person is 
more likely to have positive impressions of future encounters with police.”). 
36. See Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 48–51 
(discussing police response to complaints of racial bias by instructing officers 
to be more polite and professional). 
37. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 
25 Advances in Experimental Soc. Psychol. 115, 158–59 (1992). 
38. Meares, supra note 5, at 659. 
39. Id.  
40. Id.  
41. See Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 41–48 
(discussing the “cognitive monster” of individual and systemic race bias in 
policing and explaining that many American police departments made a 
concerted effort to address racism within the ranks but focused heavily on 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 66·Issue 4·2016 
Thin Blue Lies 
939 
stopped. Thus, before the officer has a chance to establish standing 
through courtesy—laying the groundwork for trust in the future—the 
neutrality component will be negated and adequate procedural justice 
will be rendered practically impossible. Some examples follow. 
Sometimes the area where a person is stopped is a predominantly 
black neighborhood with high drug activity or violence, as in the case 
Judge Brown wrote about. Yet, most people who live in those neighbor-
hoods are not, in fact, drug or other criminal offenders. But their prox-
imity to drug trade makes them targets for these pretextual stops, un-
dermining the expectation of individualized suspicion that our Fourth 
Amendment is supposed to protect. Most people who are stopped with 
pretext are innocent and there is no consensus that pretextual stops or 
disorder-driven ‘broken-windows’ style policing reduce crime.42 As a 
result, such aggressive policing can make innocent people feel they are 
treated like criminals in their own neighborhoods, without making that 
neighborhood demonstrably safer from crime. 
Other times, the area where a black driver is stopped is an affluent 
white neighborhood. Here, investigatory stops of black drivers may 
start off with something like “Where are you going? Why are you arou-
nd here?”43 This imposition—and the unsubtle implication that black 
people do not belong in certain areas—harkens back to a time in 
America’s not-so-distant past in which blacks were not viewed as full 
citizens by either law or custom. The United States has destroyed its 
explicitly racially discriminatory laws, but in some ways, many law en-
forcement customs maintain the racial divisions within broader society.  
Whether an investigatory stop happens in a poor black neighbor-
hood or an affluent white one, pretext for the stop plausibly—studies 
like Epp’s suggest implicitly—has a racial component. This perceived  
courteousness and professionalism without paying much attention to any 
policies that led to negative encounters). 
42. See Broken Windows Policing, Ctr. for Evidence-Based Crime Pol’y, 
http://cebcp.org/evidence-based-policing/what-works-in-policing/research- 
evidence-review/broken-windows-policing/ [https://perma.cc/PZ5S-NWQJ] 
(last visited Feb. 12, 2016) (“There is . . . no consensus on the existence of a 
link between disorder and crime, and how to properly measure such a link if 
it does indeed exist. For example, [Wesley G.] Skogan’s (1990) research in 
six cities did suggest a relationship between disorder and later serious crime, 
but [Bernard] Harcourt (2001) suggested in a re-analysis of Skogan’s (1990) 
data that there was no significant relationship between disorder and serious 
crime. Hence, there is no clear answer as to the link between crime and 
disorder and whether existing research supports or refutes broken windows 
theory.”); see also, D.A. Josi., M.E. Donahue & R. Magnus, Conducting Blue 
Light Specials or Drilling Holes in the Sky: Are Increased Traffic Stops Better 
than Routine Patrol in Taking a Bite out of Crime?, 1 Police Prac. and 
Res. 477 (2000) (noting that research showed that increases in targeted en-
forcement had mixed results). 
43. Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 5. 
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lack of neutrality compounded with a flimsy initial reason for a stop 
undermines the stop as a legitimate exercise of power44 and thus de-
tracts from police legitimacy. 
V. The Pretextual Stop is a Dishonest Practice 
Incompatible with Procedural Justice 
Many officers who conduct pretextual stops have been trained to 
ask questions that may lead to a search.45 A given officer has likely also 
been trained to ask for consent—sometimes in ways that play fast and 
loose with the truth.46 Broadly put, courts have determined that a cert-
ain amount of deception is legal, so long as it is not to deprive rights of 
the individual directly.47 But the person being goaded and deceived is 
more often than not disinterested in case law. 
Professor Christopher Slobogin, relying on the philosophy of Sissela 
Bok, has written on the ethics—rather than simply the legality—of po-
lice lying under different circumstances, particularly during the investi-
gative process. Slobogin concludes that, insofar as police officers should 
ever lie, it should be done after the person has been arrested or after 
the police have established they have probable cause to arrest a 
person48—such as to illicit a confession from a murder suspect during 
interrogation. In such circumstances, a person’s position relative to law 
enforcement as a putative lawbreaker clarifies the relationship as a po-
tentially antagonistic one and the need for trust is lessened. 
Slobogin suggests limiting police dishonesty to people who are 
deemed to be criminal suspects, such as an officer posing as a door-to-
door salesman to investigate a possible kidnapping, rather than using 
deception as a regular tactic to be used against everyone and anyone49 
to effectively end-run around constitutional protections. Put another 
way, police should not lie to gain consent for a search that is otherwise 
 
44. See id. at 132–33 (citing data to show that investigatory stops are consistently 
evaluated negatively, even when the officer is respectful). 
45. Id. at 38. 
46. Id. 
47. See, e.g., In re D.A.S., 391 A.2d 255 (D.C. 1978) (holding that police deception 
about the amount of evidence against a defendant did not invalidate voluntary 
plea under the circumstances of the case); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) 
(holding that a voluntary confession was admissible, despite the fact that the 
defendant’s interrogator falsely told the defendant that a companion had 
already confessed); but see Collazo v. Estelle 940 F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that, where police deceived a defendant into believing that it would 
hurt the defendant’s case to demand an attorney, the defendant’s confession 
was involuntary). 
48. Slobogin, supra note 21, at 777. 
49. Id. at 802–03. 
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not supported by circumstances or available evidence. The late Carl 
Klockars suggested that the moral justification for police lying relies on 
“the principle of nonmaleficence”50: “[T]he avoidance of harm . . . . 
justifies both the police use of lies and the use of force in pursuit of 
criminals. Moreover, it is also the source of limits on both force and 
lies, providing that no more of either be used than is necessary to pre-
vent harm.”51 If such a limitation is to have any meaning, the harm 
that a putative lie would be used to mitigate would need to be defined 
as imminent—not simply the potential, hunch-based suspicion that 
underlies a pretextual traffic or pedestrian stop. 
By definition, police officers only try to gain consent to search a car 
when the officers lack the probable cause to suspect criminal activity. 
Therefore, the use of deception to gain that consent must be used again-
st a presumptively innocent person, subverting the principle and spirit 
of Fourth Amendment protections. The common police motto “To pro-
tect and to serve” is in direct conflict with the antagonism inherent in 
a deceptive approach to gain consent for a search to which the officer 
is not otherwise entitled. 
Moreover, by using trickery and deceit to elicit the cooperation of 
a driver or person suspected of no crime shifts an officer’s role from 
protector and public servant in a position of trust to antagonist and 
interrogator—even if he is doing so politely. Black people who exper-
ience these stops, particularly those who experience it repeatedly, recog-
nize the difference and often resent it.52 
Deception before arrest implies an antagonism with the “potential 
dupe,”53 who is any member of the general public who is subject to an 
investigatory stop—which Epp’s and other data suggests will more than 
likely be black or Latino. As a tactic employed predominantly against 
minorities, then, the deception involved in pretextual stops undermines 
the principles of neutrality and trust needed to ensure procedural just-
ice. A policy that depends on the diminution of minorities’ dignity will 
 
50. Carl B. Klockars, Blue Lies and Police Placebos: The Morality of Police Lying, 
27 Am. Behav. Scientist 529, 533 (1984). 
51. Id. 
52. One author observed: 
In most of these [pretextual] stops, the African American driver 
described the officer as “polite” or even “nice.” In none was the driver 
given a ticket. And yet in each case, the driver described to us [the] 
fear and resentment of the experience. White drivers rarely share these 
experiences, making police stops a defining aspect of the racial divide 
in America.  
 Epp, Maynard-Moody & Haider-Markel, supra note 3, at 2. 
53. Slobogin, supra note 21, at 811. 
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undermine police—and therefore, governmental—legitimacy54 and likely 
inflict harm upon those communities.55 
VI. Changing Institutional Incentives 
The stops based on racialized suspicion and subsequent deceptions 
employed to gain consent for searches are, at their core, institutional 
choices. Pretextual stops, like all traffic or pedestrian stops, are discre-
tionary. That is, police could not stop every person who exceeded the 
speed limit or whose license plate light burned out, even if they wanted 
to. While officers are tasked with enforcing our traffic and criminal 
laws, there is no mandate to use the investigatory stop as a crime-
control tactic, and certainly there is no requirement to deceive drivers 
while doing so. Therefore, it is up to the police departments themselves 
to reevaluate and perhaps discontinue the use of the pretextual investig-
atory stop. 
Unfortunately, fixing the legitimacy problem is not as simple as 
weeding racist and prejudiced officers out of police departments—even 
if doing such a thing were simple. Over time, police officers have become 
more professionalized and less likely to use profanity or racial epithets 
that would indicate open racial hostility. Yet there are systemic incent-
ives at play that allow and encourage subtle yet racially problematic 
behaviors to proliferate. These incentives continue to sow the seeds of 
distrust between police and minority communities. The effect of these 
incentives is an erosion of police and criminal law legitimacy—and thus 
social cohesion—that is essential for a community to thrive and prosper. 
These incentives include, first and foremost, the prosecution of the 
Drug War. Discussing Whren in particular, whatever putative utility 
investigatory stops provide is concentrated heavily fighting the War on 
Drugs. Contraband seizures look good on arrest reports and big scores 
look good for cameras. But those busts say nothing about the humili-
ating experiences of countless innocent people stopped before finding 
that one car full of drugs and guns out of many fruitless and invasive 
searches. And because the drug trade is so lucrative—not just for the 
dealers, but also for the enforcers through asset forfeiture56 and other 
 
54. Id. at 796 (“[D]eception during . . . searches and seizures . . . diminishes the 
dignity and autonomy of the dupe.”); see also Sissela Bok, Lying: Moral 
Choice in Public and Private Life 142 (2d. ed. 1999) (“[W]hen a govern-
ment is known to practice deception, the results are self-defeating and erosive.”). 
55. See Hart, supra note 1, at 37 (“[T]he community is interested in the defend-
ant’s realization of his potentialities as a human being and in the contributions 
he can make to community life.”). 
56. See generally Dick M. Carpenter II et al., Institute for Justice, 
Policing for Profit: The Abuse of Civil Asset Forfeiture (2d ed. 
2015), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/policing-for-profit-2nd-
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incentives such as federal grants for drug enforcement task forces57—
limited police resources are steered toward drug enforcement and away 
from public safety and crime solving. 
The second major incentive is the arrest-as-metric for police success. 
Whether or not there is an unofficial quota, officers may maximize 
arrests for arrests’ sake because they are easily quantifiable. Again, the 
Drug War becomes a primary driver of arrests due to America’s consid-
erable drug appetite. But even beyond that, aggressive “broken win-
dows”58 style policing leads to crackdowns on loiterers, grey market 
tobacco sales, truancy, and other minor offenses—several of which have 
racist origins dating back to the post-Civil War American South.59 
Aggressive order enforcement has always and continues to fall dispro-
portionately on black Americans.60 It sometimes manifests itself as 
harassment, leading to dramatic confrontations like we saw in Staten 
Island that led to the death of Eric Garner.61 More broadly, zero-
tolerance policing disrupts the lives of minor offenders and adds to their 
criminal records,62 making them less employable and less valuable in a 
 
edition.pdf [https://perma.cc/6YME-4XJC] (discussing how civil asset for-
feiture laws are used to seize property). 
57. Drug Policy Alliance, Federal Byrne Grants: Drug War Funds 
Available for Drug Treatment 1 (Sept. 2010).  
58. Also known as “order maintenance” policing, broken windows is the nickname 
given to aggressive policing of low-level crimes in order to prevent more 
serious crimes. It is named for the article that is thought to have shifted 
public strategy. George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows, The 
Atlantic (Mar. 1982), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/ 
1982/03/broken-windows/304465/ [https://perma.cc/CK38-L2AH]. 
59. See generally Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery by Another Name: The 
Re-Enslavement of Black Americans from the Civil War to World 
War II (2008) (providing a history of the evolution of law enforcement in 
post-war years, specifically the enforcement of vagrancy and other nuisance 
laws to deprive freedmen of their liberty). 
60. See generally Khalil G. Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness 
(2010) (providing a thorough history of the use of criminal statistics and per-
ceptions of black Americans as rationale for social and criminal justice policies).  
61. Joseph Goldstein & Nate Schweber, Man’s Death After Chokehold Raises 
Old Issue for the Police, N.Y. Times (July 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/07/19/nyregion/staten-island-man-dies-after-he-is-put-in-
chokehold-during-arrest.html [https://perma.cc/V4ZK-AUVN]. 
62. Editorial, Broken Windows, Broken Lives, N.Y. Times (July 25, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/opinion/broken-windows-broken-
lives.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/23EQ-A2XS]. 
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market economy.63 Fewer legal economic opportunities may make re-
offending more likely, trapping people in a spiral of petty crime and 
incarceration. 
The third incentive, as the late William Stuntz lamented in his 
book The Collapse of American Criminal Justice, is the political pres-
sure for aggressive policing—the fears of the wider (and whiter) elector-
ate—that results in punitive measures mostly meted out on minority 
communities.64 Because whites’ interactions with police are more likely 
to be traffic-safety stops or responses to calls for assistance rather than 
dubious pretextual stops and searches, they generally are not exposed 
to the questionable practices concomitant with aggressive law enforce-
ment. Due to the perceptions of the nature of police interactions based 
on first- and second-hand knowledge, many white Americans have little 
reason to doubt the veracity and efficacy of the procedural guarantees 
in the Constitution and rulings of the Supreme Court. The proposition 
that legal opinions such as Whren and Terry effectively undermine the 
very rights they are supposed to protect when applied in practice65 is 
counter-intuitive and thus the police benefit from a popular assumption 
of fairness. In short, because white Americans are more likely to receive 
procedural justice, they are less likely to be sensitive to complaints of 
systemic bias. 
 
63. See Jonathan Blanks, Our Criminal Justice System is Making it Really 




64. See William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 
15–40 (2011) (describing “tough on crime” politics in white suburbia and the 
subsequent distribution of police resources and tactics in minority enclaves). 
65. In dismissing the racial profiling challenge under the Fourth Amendment in 
Whren v. United States, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote, “[w]e of course agree 
with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits selective enforcement of the 
law based on considerations such as race.” 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1995). The 
layperson is unlikely to distinguish (or care about) the doctrinal differences 
between unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment and Equal 
Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as the officer is rifling through 
his car looking for drugs that are not there again. Though proper legal pro-
cedure is necessary for stable jurisprudence, the practical effect of Whren is 
to enable racial profiling by way of technical violation. Because governmental 
legitimacy relies on perception of the individual or community under its rule, 
the doctrinal differences are irrelevant to the layperson outside of a court-
room. As for Terry, that “stop and frisk” became a gun control and quality 
of life tactic under then-New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg runs 
counter to the Court’s admonition in Terry’s footnote 11. Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 14 n.11, 17 n.14 (1968). Although dicta, the Court clearly warned 
about such tactical use rather than the officer-safety exception to general 
Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizure. Id. 
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Taken together, these incentives reward aggressive enforcement, ir-
respective of justice or public safety. The democratic check against ab-
use is weak because it is often concentrated in areas that do not feel 
the direct effects of that enforcement. This is a recipe for ignorance and 
tolerance of police abuse, such as questionably consensual searches after 
pretextual stops, under the guise of law. 
VII. Legal Reform and “Legitimacy-Based Law 
Enforcement Policy” 
Ending the Drug War is the singular macro-policy change that can 
reduce the harms caused by aggressive antagonistic policing. As this 
change is unlikely—though marijuana liberalization seems to be pro-
ceeding at an increasing pace among the states66—the push for whole-
sale reforms in what is legal and illegal may need to take a backseat to 
a public reexamination of how police officers go about their jobs. Such 
a reexamination would include the priority and methods of enforcement 
of the laws still on the books. A shift toward a more public-safety orien-
ted policing would likely improve percieved legitimacy in our law enfor-
cement system. 
At the agency level, professors Cynthia Lum and Daniel Nagin sug-
gest two guiding principles for policing in a democratic society: 
1. Crime prevention, not arrests, should be the paramount focus 
of police organizations and the metric by which they are evaluated. 
2. Citizen response to the police and their tactics for preventing 
crime and disorder matter independent of police effectiveness in these 
functions.67 
These two principles get to the heart of police legitimacy: increasing 
institutional respect for citizens by focusing on keeping them safe and 
responding to their needs. These principles move toward what Yale law 
professor Tracey Meares calls “legitimacy-based law enforcement pol-
icy.”68 She writes, “A legitimacy-based program of law enforcement will 
focus more on persuasion than it will focus on punishment. And to 
 
66. See State Policy, Marijuana Policy Project, https://www.mpp.org/ 
states/ [https://perma.cc/XZL6-NHCS] (last visited Mar. 20, 2016) (noting 
differences in marijuana policy across the United States). 
67. Cynthia Lum & Daniel Nagin, Reinventing American Policing: A Seven-
Point Blueprint for the 21st Century, Crime and Justice: A Review of 
Research (forthcoming 2016); Cynthia Lum & Daniel S. Nagin, Reinventing 
American Policing, The Crime Report (June 24, 2015), http://www. 
thecrimereport.org/news/articles/2015-06-reinventing-american-policing-
a-seven-point-blueprin [https://perma.cc/C5VJ-QNKN].  
68.  Meares, supra note 5, at 660. 
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achieve persuasion, authorities will have to pay attention to the creat-
ion of the necessary social capital that engenders trust relationships 
between governors and the governed.”69 
In keeping with Lum and Nagin’s two principles, the practice of 
pretextual investigatory stops should be greatly curtailed, if not ended 
outright. The evidence that pretextual stops have substantial effects on 
crime control is, at best, mixed, yet the evidence that they exacerbate 
community mistrust is considerable and growing. Indeed, a practice 
that relies on police deception of the legally innocent to waive their 
constitutional rights is inimical to establishing the “trust relationships” 
that Meares suggests. 
There is no question that pretextual stops ensnare more innocent 
people than guilty ones. Furthermore, they may alienate police from 
the public through legal but ethically dubious actions in furtherance of 
their institutional incentives that are not necessarily congruent with the 
public interest. The longer-term social costs of pretextual stops far out-
weigh the fleeting gains from the arrests they enable. 
Ending or severely limiting pretextual stops should be part of a 
broader shift away from unnecessary hostile confrontations with the 
public and toward more positive everyday interactions with people in 
those communities. So long as police act as antagonistic agents with 
the law abiding public, trust will be impossible. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, it is up to the police to establish and protect their legiti-
macy with the communities they are sworn to protect and serve. Agg-
ressive law enforcement and deterrence may have reduced some crime, 
but police departments nevertheless suffer trust and legitimacy issues 
with many American black communities. As a result, African American 
communities suffer from the effects of crime made easier by the comm-
unities’ strained and, at times, antagonistic relationship with the police. 
Because the courts are unwilling or unable to rein-in police tactics that 
subvert the spirit of the laws protecting individual dignity, as cases like 
Whren demonstrate, black communities have little hope of judicial re-
dress for abusive policies upheld by legal fictions. Procedural justice 
may be a partial remedy to heal the relationships between black comm-
unities and the police, but police agencies and legislators will need to 
reorient law enforcement priorities and strategies to better serve the 
communities that need their protection the most. This will require a 
new understanding of police efficacy and reorienting the relationships 
between the police and each of the communities they serve. 
 
 
69. Id. 
